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II. OBJECTIONS TO ORVIS 5 STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Orvis' Appellee's Brief makes numerous mis-statements of fact which should be corrected
at the outset. Space permits only the more flagrant to be corrected here. Orvis, at page 7, inserts a
quote from the SBA deposition (again entirely out of context) to the effect that Johnson, because of
his bar problem, stepped down from Lexington Law Firm. Orvis neglects to disclose that at this
same time that Johnson entered into the agreement stepping down from Lexington Law Firm, Orvis
executed a memorandum of partnership with Johnson affirming the partnership in all Orvis/Johnson
credit repair businesses. Lexington Law Firm is not the partnership in issue, but one of the
partnership's activities was to operate the marketing for such law firm. Both the partnership
agreement with Orvis, and the resignation from Lexington, were attached as exhibits to Johnson's
affidavit in opposition to Orvis' summary judgment and this was specifically argued to Judge
Hanson below (R. 2266-2515). Moreover, Orvis himself is not a lawyer and cannot be a partner in
a law firm nor control it. Such is a clear violation of law. Orvis' claim that by his resignation from
Lexington, Orvis somehow proves that Johnson abandoned an Orvis business, would seem to be a
tacit admission that he views the law firm as his.
Another example on page 9 and elsewhere, Orvis argues that the "sole" evidence in
opposition to his Motion for Summary Judgment was merely an affidavit and implies that it contains
no substantive proof in opposition. Orvis neglects to note that there were 19 exhibits with the
affidavit including specific deposition testimony adduced in this case supporting the partnership, and
documenting Orvis' embezzlement and use of partnership funds to purchase the SBA judgment; and
including evidence of the profit share from the partnership divided between the Johnsons and Orvis,
etc. The affidavit contains a wide range of proof well beyond that necessary to establish the
partnership, let alone which also rebuts Orvis' superficial and legally dubious summary judgment
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motion.
IIL ARGUMENT
ISSUE NO. 1: THE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT CORRECTLY
CONSTRUE AND APPLY THE RESPECTIVE PROCEDURAL BURDENS
BORNE BY OPPOSING PARTIES ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT,
a, Orvis never properly factually supported each element of judicial estoppel.
therefore no prima facie case was set forth to shift any burden to Johnson,
There is a fundamental flaw in Orvis' argument that pervades his entire brief. It is this:
Orvis' repeated argument is summed up by his quote from Waddoups v. Amalgamated Sugar
Co., 54 P.3d 1054 (Utah 2002) on p. 20 of his Brief, "In Waddoups... the moving party met
its initial burden by pointing out that plaintiffs did not have proof sufficient to meet an
essential element of their... claims." [Emphasis added]. This may or may not be the correct
statement of the law, but Orvis, the moving party, entirely failed to do what he claims a
moving party must do. Orvis' summary judgment motion below did not once address any
element of Johnson's partnership claim or discuss elements of partnerships nor attempt to
negate their existence. While Johnson provided overwhelming evidence of the partnership,
documentary and witness testimony, some 19 exhibits laid out in his Affidavit Opposing
Summary Judgment (R. 2266-2515) including everything from express written partnership
agreements to years of partnership profit sharing to deposition testimony of Orvis employees
that he was embezzling partnership funds from the Johnson, Orvis never to begin with
addresses any element of the partnership doctrine that would have operated to shift any
burden to Johnson.
The elements of a partnership have been amply defined by this Court. As the Court
-2-

of Appeals stated in Mardanlou v. Ghaffarian, 135 P.3d 904 (Utah App.2006):
The "basic principle of partnership law is set forth in our Uniform Partnership Act,
Title 48 of U.C.A.1953 ." Cutler v. Bowen, 543 P.2d 1349, 1351 (Utah 1975). "
'Partnership ' is defined as 'an association of two or more persons to carry on a
business for profit.' " Parduhn v. Bennett, 2002 UT 93,1114, 61 P.3d 982 (emphasis
omitted) (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-3 (1998)). The requirements for
establishing the existence of a partnership are not exactly defined, but certain
elements are essential: The parties must combine their property, money, effects, skill,
labor and knowledge. As a general rule, there must be a community of interest in the
performance of the common purpose, a joint propriety interest in the subject matter,
a mutual right to control, a right to share profits, and unless there is an agreement to
the contrary, a duty to share in any losses which may be sustained. Bassett v. Baker,
530 P.2d 1, 2 (Utah 1974).
More tellingly, this Court in Cheves v. Williams, 993 P.2d 191 (Utahl999) specifically
held that whether a partner proclaims or disavows existence of a partnership is of no avail
because the existence of the partnership is determined under partnership law, not what the
partners say about it. Nowhere is an inconsistent statement (or a consistent one) an element
of the doctrine of partnership. Indeed, as recognized in Cheves, individuals inadvertently or
knowingly assert or disaffirm partnerships regularly without affecting whether there is indeed
an actual partnership under the law. While Johnson has credibly shown that Orvis' distorted
SBA deposition quote does not mean at all what Orvis would have it mean, nonetheless even
if the evidence is weighed, intent and credibility assessed to accept Orvis' interpretation as
was done by the Court of Appeals, that quote does not go to the "essential elements" of a
partnership claim. Partners often accurately or inaccurately make statements that there is or
is not a partnership to the IRS, to banks, lenders, creditors, ex-wives, CPA's, gambling
commissions, etc. However, a partnership is proven by none of these, but rather by the
elements of partnership law regardless of what individuals may say that is consistent or
-3-

inconsistent. Indeed, if partners could create, alter or break a partnerships and avoid
accounting and cover embezzlement simply by an inconsistent or consistent statement,
partnership litigation would be full of such self-serving statements.
Thus, the fundamental deficiency of Orvis' summary judgment motion is a threshold
one amply condemned by Orvis' own argument here. He omitted to address, in his summary
judgment motion any actual element of the partnership claim. His motion only dealt with an
alleged inconsistent statement by Johnson. However, even if we assume Orvis' self-serving,
claim of a belatedly discovered, un-relied on, truncated deposition statement by Johnson in
an entirely different judicial system which, by the way, was never even mentioned to the
presiding federal judge in the case, which was purchased by Orvis with money embezzled
from the partnership, is an inconsistent statement, it nonetheless does not negate, rebut or
vitiate any element of the partnership between Johnson and Orvis. Such an allegedly
inconsistent statement might possibly go to credibility. But to get this statement noticed in
any dispositive way, Orvis must erect it on the scaffolding of judicial estoppel, but several
levels of that scaffolding did not arrive in the truck. The "inconsistent statement" is useless
to Orvis otherwise. Before Johnson as the non-moving party need take regard of this tortured
little statement, it must meet and Orvis must argue, every element of judicial estoppel. Orvis
may not merely assert an inconsistent statement and announce that it rebuts an actual defined
element of the partnership doctrine. It does not. This tortured and hotly disputed single
statement cannot as a naked phrase enter the front gates of our judicial consciousness unless
it is formally draped in the full robes of judicial estoppel. It may seek admittance through a
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back door by standing in line with other credibility impeachers, but it will have to elbow
through that narrow back door called relevance and then be assessed by a jury.
In Orvis' Brief, each of the dozen or so times Orvis insists that the moving party may
shift the burden by arguing a deficiency in an essential element of the non-moving party's
legal claim, Orvis averts his eyes and leaps over the gaping hole in his own argument below.
He omitted to address any element of partnership claims. Instead, Orvis points to a phrase
that must be bolstered by a different doctrine, judicial estoppel, and unfortunately, he also
forgot and omitted to argue the elements of judicial estoppel.
The defect in Orvis' analysis of summary judgment as to judicial estoppel is
highlighted by the paraphrasing as he does the requirements of Rule 56, on p. 19 of his brief
that, "Once a moving party has properly supported her [sic] motion as required by Rule
56(c), Rule 56(c) shifts the burden to the nonmoving party and requires him to respond with
evidence *set[ing] forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'
[emphasis added]." The properly supported prima facie case was never made to begin with
to even reach the academic discussion of whether initial burdens or ultimate burdens or
burden shifting should apply.1 Orvis makes a contorted claim that a movant can either satisfy
its burden of proof "that there are no genuine issues of material fact and judgment in the
moving party's favor is therefore warranted as a matter of law" or where as here, in trying
to defeat a counterclaim, that the moving party "satisfies its initial burden by challenging the
nonmoving party's ability to prove an essential element of its case on the basis that no

Record 1940-1948 and 1957-1964
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genuine issue of material fact exists as to that element/' p. 16. He then alleges that the
existence of an Orvis-Johnson business partnership is defeated by application of the doctrine
of judicial estoppel by mere assertion of a prior inconsistent statement without more which
defeats Johnson's counterclaim. The problem is there are several missing links in this
tautology, apart from disputes of fact.
Orvis' argument begins with this unfounded assumption that he made out a prima
facie to support summary judgment on the claim of judicial estoppel. This is simply not true.
Orvis did not for the most part even allege facts to provide support for each element required
to establish judicial estoppel, indeed he has argued some of them are not or should not be
considered as elements. The required elements of Utah law are namely: 1) the party opposing
judicial estoppel seeks to deny a position he or she took in a prior judicial proceeding [i.e.
a prior inconsistent statement or position]; 2) the prior and subsequent judicial proceedings
involve the same parties or their privies; 3) the prior and subsequent judicial proceedings
involve the same subject matter; 4) the party seeking judicial estoppel in the subsequent
judicial proceeding must have relied on the former testimony; 5) the position must have been
successfully maintained in the former action and 6) the party against whom judicial estoppel
is sought must have exhibited bad faith in making an intentional misrepresentation, Tracy
Loan & Trust Co. v. Openshaw Investment Co., 132 P. 2d 388 (Utah 1942) as supplemented
by 3D Constr. &Dev., L.L.C. v. Old Standard Life Ins. Co., Ill P. 3d 1082 (Utah 2005).
The missing elements 2-6 Orvis either ignores or claims need not be alleged because
Johnson in opposing summary judgment did not raise them. The Court of Appeals panel
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decision did not even bother to analyze two necessary elements - bad faith and reliance,
falsely claiming these had not been raised below (refuted in discussion below) and were
therefore "waived." This posture presents the peculiar anomaly of claiming a moving party
can be entitled to a judgment as a matter of law without even sustaining all of the elements
of a claim under the law. The analysis given to the existence of a prior inconsistent statement
was woefully superficial and refuted by the record or the law as were the elements of same
parties or privies, same subject matter and successful maintenance. The failure of Orvis to
raise and factually support necessary elements of judicial estoppel is only overcome as the
panel seems to indicate by (incorrectly) asserting that these necessary elements of the
doctrine need not be pled or presented by Orvis, the moving party. This is clear error. This
is contorted logic that a party can raise a legal claim with six elements and prevail by
asserting facts supporting only one of them then relying on an opposing party's alleged
failure to point out the defect in "properly supporting" the motion to begin with, while also
ignoring Johnson did raise the missing elements in the trial court, argued them and briefed
them. Moreover, the panel and Orvis sidestepped the very real and substantial dispute as to
that one fact as to whether that prior real estate partnership statement was in fact inconsistent
with Johnson's current position by weighing the disputed evidence and Johnson's motive,
credibility and inferring intent.
b. The Court of Appeals burden shifting stands summary judgment on its head
as a moving party always has the burden and weighing evidence is province of jury.
In order to reach this issue, it must be overlooked that no "initial burden" or prima
facie case was alleged by Orvis to begin with. Thus, to a large extent this is something of an
-7-

advisory opinion on this issue which need not be reached because it is not ripe. This has
previously not been favored in this Court, "Houghton v. Department ofHealth, 125 P.3d 860
(Utah 2005) quoting Provo City Corp. v. Thompson, 86 P.3d 735 (Utah 2004), "We have
observed on many occasions that this court is not inclined to issue mere advisory opinions,"
or as stated in State v. Ortiz, 987 P.2d 39 (Utah 1999):
Where there exists no more than a difference of opinion regarding the hypothetical
application of a piece of legislation to a situation in which the parties might, at some
future time, find themselves, the question is unripe for adjudication.
Orvis argues that either Rule 56 already requires a burden shifting or if it does not,
this Court should adopt the Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, All U.S. 317 (1986) summary judgment
burden shifting analysis. Orvis claims this Court did adopt a burden shifting analysis in
Waddoups v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 54 P.3d 1054 (Utah 2002). Waddoups while having
originally arose from a summary judgment was an appeal of a dismissal of an amended
complaint decided under a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss rather than a Rule 56 motion for
summary judgment and involved choice of law and conflicts of law issues readily
distinguishable from anything involved in this case. The language from Waddoups Orvis
relies on is:
However, once the moving party challenges an element of the nonmoving party's case
on the basis that no genuine issue of material fact exists, the burden then shifts to the
nonmoving party to present evidence that is sufficient to establish a genuine issue of
material fact.
Waddoups then went on to discuss the elements of the legal claims for interference with
prospective economic advantage, and conspiracy which were missing from the Plaintiffs
complaint. This is not really what is present in the instant case at all. Orvis did not literally
-8-

challenge "an element" of Johnson's counterclaims for partnership accounting and
embezzlement. Instead he is invoking a doctrine to prevent even looking at any element of
the partnership accounting claim and it is that doctrine which is the subject matter of this
appeal, not the substantive claim. Orvis challenges the existence of the partnership despite
overwhelming evidence to the contrary, including his lawsuit seeking to avoid it.
Every analysis of summary judgment agrees on the same starting place of analysis,
the existence of two requirements - no dispute of material facts and entitlement to a judgment
as a matter of law based on those undisputed facts. Orvis and the Court of Appeals panel
ignore both of these fundamentals. Apart from allocating burdens of proof on a summary
judgment motion of initial burden, opposing, ultimate and any others, the concept is far too
simplistic and incomplete for what is involved in applying for and opposing a summary
judgement. An opponent of a summary judgement may oppose a summary judgment in at
least three ways: 1) if the movant has not established any proof of one or more of the
elements of the claim for which judgment is sought [as herein], then the opponent has no
burden at all other than to argue the law - that the movant would not be entitled to judgment
as a matter of law, and facts are almost irrelevant at that point; 2) if the movant has presented
material facts of each element of claim, i.e. a properly supported claim, which on their face
might entitle the movant to a judgment, then the opponent may dispute some of the material
facts alleged by movant; or 3) the opponent might allege sufficient other additional material
facts as to elements of the legal claims involved without controverting any of the movant's
facts.
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The problem with calling this "burden shifting" is, despite what Orvis claims, that
identified by Judge Bench's concurring opinion in this case and his dissent in Shaw Res. Ltd.,
L.L. C. v. Pruitt, Gushee & Bachtell, P. C., 142 P. 3d 560 (Utah App. 2002) that "the burden
in federal courts has been shifted to the nonmoving party, aligning the 'movant's production
burden for summary judgment to the burden of proof that party would bear at trial.'" This
burden shifting notion is akin to the ultimate burden of proof at trial because inherent in the
concept is weighing evidence, sifting conflicting claims, evaluating credibility, motive,
intent, etc. - all traditionally rigorously abhorred in motions for summary judgment,
Anderson Development Co. v. Tobias, 116 P.3d 323 (Utah 2005); Winegarv. Froereret. al,
813 P.2d 104 (Utah 1991); Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein & Fielding, 909 P.2d 1283 (Utah
App. 1996); Masters v. Worsley, 111 P.2d 499 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
Orvis goes on to invoke this Court's rule-making powers to adopt such a burden
shifting rule to apply to this case where it could not be invoked due to failure to "properly
support" each element of a prima facie case to begin with. The burden in a Rule 56 motion
is a simple yes or no question - are there material facts in dispute or not? Only if material
facts are not in dispute, then do they entitle the movant to judgment as a matter of law? Orvis
has not even attempted to meet the established elements required by this Court to overturn
prior precedent, State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 398 (Utah 1994):
We will not overturn precedent "unless clearly convinced that the rule was originally
erroneous or is no longer sound because of changing conditions and that more good
than harm will come by departing from precedent." Id. at 399 (quoting John Hanna,
The Role of Precedent in Judicial Decision, 2 Vill. L.Rev. 367, 367 (1957) ).
Orvis instead argues that Utah should adopt this analysis because other courts do.
-10-

They recite as grounds therefore the same grounds that support the use of summary judgment
to begin with - overworked courts and rooting out deficient or unsupported claims. This is
not an additional reason to promulgate a new standard of proof which disregards prior
precedent for summary judgments relying on the common meaning of the plain language of
the rule - "The judgment sought shall be rendered if... there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." A
summary judgment is not the time to determine who has the better evidence, but only to
determine whether any opposing evidence exists.
ISSUE NO, 2: THE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT CORRECTLY
APPLY THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD IN THIS CASE,
Orvis' argument supporting summary judgment relies on the policy behind judicial
estoppel and a perceived prior inconsistent statement. Without bothering to argue why
alleging only one of six required elements would entitle him to judgment as "a matter of
law/' he simply claims Johnson did not create a dispute of fact as to the prior inconsistent
statement and waived the remaining elements - both false assertions.
a. The single element of judicial estoppel alleged by Orvis - prior inconsistent
statement - was subject to a genuine dispute.
The fact that the parties are here before the Utah Supreme Court arguing about the
meaning, intent and content of facts demonstrates the existence of a dispute of material fact.
The problem with the Orvis and Court of Appeals analysis is that they would remove these
issues of dispute from the jury and allow the trial judge to determine credibility and weigh
evidence. In his opening brief, Orvis for the first time in the record of this case recites the full
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text of alleged prior inconsistent statement made by Johnson in his deposition to the SBA.
He still overlooks the other preceding parts of that deposition where this very partnership and
related business ventures were explored in excruciating detail. Yet he simply asks this Court
to say "black is white" and that the quoted text does not mean exactly what it says. He says
there is nothing to support Johnson's assertion that the following quote refers only to real
estate ventures:
Q. Do you have any interest in any partnership?
A. No, I mean you know, often I'll have a joint endeavor with somebody but I don't
have a partnership or set up a partnership or an L.L.C. You know if I get a deal I say,
[h]ey, do you want to do this deal together? We'll go up to Summit County and buy
a lot. [Emphasis added]
(Record p. 2424; 1231-1232, Jamis Johnson SBA Deposition, p. 30 lines 16-25 and p. 31,
lines 1-24).
One easy place to analyze the plain meaning of this statement is to read all of the
words in the entire quote used themselves. Johnson explicitly referenced "lots" and specific
real estate ventures he had engaged in previously, for instance, in Summit County. Orvis
argues this can only be interpreted the way he wants it to be to create an inconsistent
statement, without any reference to the surrounding testimony in that and prior days'
depositions, the actual text of the answer and Johnson's subjective intent and meaning of his
answer as well his understanding of the question - i.e. highly fact dependent questions.
Johnson has documented the nature of his interpretation of the question and answer in his
affidavit, supporting exhibits, arguments below and his prior brief herein. The District Court
and the Court of Appeals both adopted the Orvis interpretation of this quote and granted and
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upheld summary judgment respectively.
Orvis and the Court of Appeals continue to claim despite a record to the contrary,
"Nothing in Johnson's affidavit supports his assertion that his response in the SBA
deposition to the question about partnerships was based on his belief that it referred only to
partnerships in real estate," which assertion is defied by the plain language of the full quote
itself, much less the context in which it arose. To be satisfied of one set of facts over another
involves a weighing of the two sets of facts. This of course is not permissible, as a matter of
law, on a motion for summary judgment. Winegar v. Froerer et aL, supra. The disparate
meanings of the SBA quote are a central focus of the case rendering it not susceptible to
summary judgment.
b. The Orvis9 failure to plead or allege facts supporting the remaining missing
elements of judicial estoppel defeat application of the doctrine,
i. Contrary to Orvis' assertion reliance can be or was waived, reliance is a
critical and indispensable requirement for judicial estoppel
Orvis claims he need not present a necessary element of judicial estoppel because
Johnson did not argue it was an element and did not preserve the issue below. This overlooks
the requirements of Rule 56 that Orvis present facts showing he is entitled to judgment "as
a matter of law" but also ignores the record below and on appeal. This claim that Johnson did
not raise reliance is simply false. Johnson did clearly raise it in argument and by citing the
specific cases calling for it in his pleadings.2 For example, at the hearing before Judge Hanson
on the elements necessary to support judicial estoppel which are lacking herein, counsel stated

2

R. 2279-2281, R. 2508 -Tr. p. 18,1. 103, 23-24, p. 19,1. 3-12
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at R 2708 - Tr. p. 18,1. 1-2, "that's another party, that detrimentally changed its position by
reason of Salt Lake's inaccurate representation of Utah's water law in progress," and at R.
2708 - Tr. p. 19,1.3-6, "The party claiming estoppel must have been misled and have changed
its position. Here there's been zero reliance by Mr. Orvis" [Emphasis added]. Orvis' attorney
responded and also argued reliance to the trial court at R. 2708, Tr. p. 34,1. 20-25. Johnson's
Memorandum to the District Court cited the cases of Nebeker v. Utah State Tax Commission,
34 P. 3d 180 (Utah 2001), Salt Lake City v. Silver Fork Pipeline Corp., 913 P.2d 731 (Utah
1995), and Tracy, supra, for the elements of judicial estoppel, which all require reliance.
Judicial estoppel is also inapplicable herein as additionally held in connection with reliance
by Silver Fork, "The rule of judicial estoppel does not apply . . . when the knowledge or
means of knowledge of both parties is equal." Orvis per se would have equal or better
knowledge about his partnership with Johnson.
Nonetheless, as the majority of this Court has consistently determined, as with any
form of estoppel, an essential element of judicial estoppel is detrimental reliance. The
District Court and Court of Appeals ignored this reliance element altogether. In Masters v.
Worsley, supra, the Court of Appeals reiterated the Supreme Court's holding on this issue:

In Tracy Loan & Trust Co. v Openshaw Inv. Co., 102 Utah 509,132 P.2d 388, 390
(1942), the Utah Supreme Court said that a party invoking judicial estoppel must
show that he or she has done something or omitted to do something in reliance on the
other party's testimony in the earlier proceeding, and will be prejudiced if the facts are
different from those upon which he or she relied. Id. However, "there is no estoppel
where there was no reliance and the parties had equal knowledge of the facts." Id. at
390-91. However, in Richards v. Hodson, 26 Utah 2d 113, 485 P.2d 1044, 1046
(1971), the court clarified that the doctrine was really akin to collateral estoppel and
applied only to issues actually litigated, not those which merely could have been
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determined. [Emphasis added.]
There is no evidence of reliance by Orvis on the SBA quote - detrimental or
otherwise. Summary judgment must be reversed because Orvis failed to plead or prove this
essential element of judicial estoppel. "There is no estoppel where there was no reliance" is
the controlling principal here. The failure to allege any prima facie case that includes
reliance, much less provide even nominal facts in support of this essential element of reliance
renders the doctrine of judicial estoppel wholly inapplicable as a matter of law. For this
reason alone, the District Court and Court of Appeals have committed manifest error.
ii. Orvis' claim to be a privy of the SBA is false.
Orvis simply make a naked assertion that Johnson created no dispute of material fact
that Orvis was privy of the SBA. Such assertion defies both the record and the law. Orvis
asserts simply because it was admitted that he received an assignment of the SBA judgment
he becomes ipso facto a privy. This ignores the issue in dispute -purchase of the assignment
of the judgment through a sham dissolved LLC using embezzled partnership funds which
make the judgment property of the partnership, not Orvis personally.
Johnson has asserted from the outset that Orvis purchased the judgment with monies
wrongfully taken from the partnership and stated this in his Affidavit in Opposition to
Summary Judgment, HH4,52,53 and 54.3 This was supported by sworn deposition testimony
of Orvis employee Thomas Triplett (Record p.855-875), Orvis partner Jade Griffin (Record
p. 877-884), and attorney Lawrence employee, Will Vigil (Record p. 2285-2288). The facts

3

Record 2267, 2280
-15-

of record show that the SBA judgment was purchased by an expired and defunct Utah limited
liability company, All Star Financial, LLC (owned by a relative of an Orvis partner and party
herein-Deon Stoeckling). All Star was used by Orvis to conceal his identity from the SBA.4
Within 24 hours after the purchase, All Star assigned the SBA judgment to Orvis. Orvis used
the Johnson profit share monies to pay the SBA. This plan was proposed and orchestrated
by Victor Lawrence with Orvis. Lawrence, as Johnson's attorney to the SBA, knew the
amount Johnson was negotiating with the SBA to pay to settle the judgment and that was the
amount Orvis paid.5
Whether the purchaser of the judgment is a privy to the SBA is not the dispute raised
with respect to Orvis' party or privy status, but instead that Orvis used embezzled partnership
money to purchase the SBA judgment and used a defunct "straw man" to disguise his
identity. Johnson pointed out to the District Court and Court of Appeals that Orvis could not
be a privy because Orvis does not actually own the SBA judgment. Having been purchased
with misappropriated partnership funds, under well established Utah law, the SBA judgment
would be the property not of Orvis but of the partnership, even if held in Orvis' name.
Utah statute and case law are well-established and long-standing that assets purchased
with partnership monies, even if the assets are held in the name of an individual partner, are
the property of the partnership. Utah Code Anno. §48-1-5 provides, in part, "Unless the
contrary intention appears, property acquired with partnership funds is partnership property."

4

Record 2256-2257; 2280-2281

5

See also Record 2098-2101, 2285-2367, 2389-2394
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As previously noted to this Court and not addressed by Orvis, this statute's substance has
uniformly been the holding of Utah courts on partnership property beginning with Deming
v. Moss, 123 P. 971 (Utah 1912):
The law with respect to what, prima facie at least, constitutes partnership property as
between partners is well stated in 22 A. & E. Ency., L. (2d Ed.) 91, in the following
words: "All property brought with funds belonging to a firm is, prima facie at least,
the property of the partnership, though the title to such property be taken in the
individual names of one or more of the partners."
See Frandsen v. Holladay, 739 P.2d 1111,1113 (Utah App. 1987). Deming was quoted as
standing for the rule that is "settled in this jurisdiction" and "amply supported by numerous
authorities" in Staats v. Staats, 226 P. 677 (Utah 1924). Utah's current statute was referenced
in Fullmer v. Blood, 546 P. 2d 606 (Utah 1976):
Our statute provides that when property is purchased with partnership funds it
becomes property of the partnership, unless a contrary intention is shown. This is true
regardless of the form of the transaction, including where the purchase is made in the
name of one or more of the partners as individuals without reference to the
partnership.
Accordingly, this would make the partnership a "privy" of the SBA, not Orvis. Since this is
a genuine factual issue raised below that had to be tried, this element of whether the parties
are the same or privies precludes summary judgment as a matter of law. It is not permissible
to weigh two versions of facts on a motion for summary judgment, Winegar v. Froerer et
aly supra. These are all substantial and material issues of fact raised below but ignored by
the District Court and the Court of Appeals in its grant of summary judgment to Orvis.
iii. Contrary to Orvis' assertion, the subject matter of the prior federal case is
different from the subject matter of the present state case.
The prior case was a contract guarantee action and a foreclosure deficiency action
-17-

brought by the SBA against Johnson.6 Orvis claims that because the purpose of the
deposition was to identify assets for collecting on the SBA judgment, that subject matter
makes the subject matter of the lawsuit the same as the instant case regarding partnership
embezzlement by Orvis and an accounting therefor. This is simply a stretch. The subject
matters of the prior federal action and this state action are clearly different. Orvis engages
in a fiction or disregards the actual content of this element to claim the subject matter of the
two unrelated lawsuits were the same by claiming that the issue of the existence of the OrvisJohnson partnership was in dispute regardless of the actual "subject matter" of the litigation
itself.
Orvis distinguished the "actually litigated" requirement from Masters v. Worsley,
supra, wherein the Court of Appeals stated the Utah Supreme Court had clarified the
doctrine of judicial estoppel by holding that "the doctrine [judicial estoppel] was really akin
to collateral estoppel and applied only to issues actually litigated, not those which could have
been determined;' tiling Richards v. Hodson, 26 Utah 2d 113, 485 P.2d 1044,1046 (1971)
by claiming it related only to collateral estoppel and not judicial estoppel. The Richards case
was indeed a case about collateral estoppel, however, Masters expressly adopted this
requirement precisely to define judicial estoppel. The only subject matter litigated, and thus
cognizable for application of judicial estoppel, in the prior SBA action were the foreclosure
action and the guarantee contract. The specific Orvis-Johnson business relationship in this

6

The SBA extensively litigated mortgage deficiency action centered primarily on
the issue of whether the differing federal limitation period for pursuing SBA backed
mortgage deficiencies trumped Utah's three month trust deed statute limitation period.
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case was not litigated in the prior SBA action, and so, Orvis fails the "same subject matter"
test. He may not invoke judicial estoppel.
iv. Orvis' claim the Johnson position was "successfully maintained" in federal
court for judicial estoppel to apply is false.
Orvis overlooks the failure to have ever pled this element to begin with by claiming
"it is undeniable . . . that... the SBA was unable to collect on its judgment." This is indeed
very deniable, as pointed out in Johnson's brief. In fact, it indulges rank speculation to
presume the SBA sat passive not collecting because they relied on a claim Johnson had no
partnership with Orvis. There is simply no fact to support this proposition. Instead, quite the
contrary is shown. Neither Orvis nor the Court of Appeals knows what the SBA did or did
not do and there was no evidence presented by Orvis or facts alleged regarding this.
Moreover, the SBA did collect on its judgment.7 The SBA actually did collect on its
judgment for the exact amount negotiated with Johnson. Indeed, Orvis himself paid the SBA
and in fact, paid the exact amount that Johnson had negotiated with the SBA to pay off the
SBA judgment.
Orvis somewhat confuses "successfully maintain" with "actually litigated, although
both may be required." As explained in 3D Const, and Development, L.L.C. v. Old Standard
Life Ins. Co., supra:
"Under judicial estoppel, 'a person may not, to the prejudice of another person, deny
any position taken in a prior judicial proceeding between the same persons or their
privies involving the same subject matter, if such prior position was successfully
maintained.'" Nebeker v. State Tax Comm'n, 2001 UT 74, 26, 34 P.3d 180 (quoting
Tracy Loan & Trust Co. v. Openshaw Inv. Co., 102 Utah 509, 132 P.2d 388, 390
7

see R. 2282, 1150, R. 2508 - Tr. p. 17,1.10-14
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(1942))
Moreover, judicial estoppel is inappropriate where the party against
whom judicial estoppel is sought did not successfully maintain the inconsistent
position in the prior proceedings. SeeStevensen v. Goodson, 924 P.2d 339,353 (Utah
1996) (explaining "the rule followed in Utah requires that the party seeking judicial
relief must have prevailed upon its statement in the earlier proceeding.").
Thus, it is not a matter of having necessarily actually litigated a position, but that the
position have been put before the Court, tried and tested in a courtroom and adopted by the
Court and maintained by the party asserting it. This is substantially more than a cast off
phrase in a deposition by a party. It is error to suggest that a non-action by the SBA
constitutes having successfully maintained a position of "no partnership"with Orvis or
having "prevailed" before the Honorable U.S. District Court Judge Bruce Jenkins, the federal
judge presiding over the SBA case. Judge Jenkins never considered or ruled upon the
position. This element of "successful maintenance" of an issue requires that the prior federal
court not only have actually reviewed and relied on the position, but the party asserting the
position (Johnson) "prevailed" on that issue before the court. The District Court and the
Court of Appeals again ignored an essential element of judicial estoppel.
v. Orvis failed to address Johnson's purported prior statement to the SBA, if
inconsistent, was the result of inadvertence or mistake, not bad faith.
Orvis again seeks refuge that a necessary legal element of his claim for relief under
judicial estoppel need not be met because Johnson did not raise it below. This simply defies
the requirement of being entitled to a judgment based upon undisputed facts "as a matter of
law." The law requires six elements, not one. Yet to claim that Johnson did not raise this as
an element simply ignores every pleading and argument and memorandum he has filed
throughout the litigation from his initial counterclaim to his counter-affidavit to the summary
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judgment, forward.8 Mere inadvertence or mistake in making an inconsistent statement is not
sufficient to sustain judicial estoppel. There must be "bad faith" to invoke judicial estoppel
as discussed, infra, as well as all other essential elements. The SBA answer was at most a
mistake and there is not any evidence of bad faith.
If Johnson's answer, based upon his misunderstanding of the scope of the question,
was indeed "no interest in any partnership whatsoever including business dealings with Orvis
which we have already discussed at length," this clearly falls within the definition of
"mistake"as set forth in Utah Coal and Lumber Restaurant, Inc. v. Outdoor Endeavors
Unlimited, 40 P.3d 581 (Utah 2001):
Indeed, [a] mistake within the meaning of equity is a non-negligent but erroneous
mental condition, conception, or conviction induced by ignorance, misapprehension,
or misunderstanding, resulting in some act or omission done or suffered by one or
both parties, without its erroneous character being intended or known at the time. 27A
Am.Jur.2d Equity § 7 (1996). We acknowledged this principle over seventy years ago
in Provo Reservoir Co. v. Tanner, 68 Utah 21, 25-26, 249 P. 118,119 (1926),
This is an appeal of Judge Hanson's decision. Whether Johnson had raised this
element or not, Judge Hanson certainly made an explicit finding of its presence from which
Johnson is entitled to appeal. Judge Hanson's finding of "no mistake" while an improper
weighing of evidence and credibility, does not ipso facto meet the "bad faith"element for
judicial estoppel required by 3D Const, and Development, L.L.C. v. Old Standard Life Ins.
Co., supra, however, but even assuming for purpose of argument that Judge Hanson's ruling
does incorporate "bad faith," the most critical defect of Judge Hanson's presumption of "bad
faith" in terms of this summary judgment with opposing views established in the record, was
8

Record p. 2261
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the well-established principle expressed in Still Standing Stable, LLC v. Allen, 122 P.3d 556
(Utah 2005):
'[A] finding of bad faith turns on a factual determination of a party's subjective
intent.' Id. [Utah Dep't ofSoc. Servs. v. Adams, 806 P.2d 1193, 1198 n. 6 (Utah
Ct.App.1991)] (citing Pennington v. Allstate Ins. Co., 973 P.2d 932, 939 n. 3 (Utah
1998)).
Still Standing also explicitly states that making a presumption of bad faith in the absence of
evidence is impermissible. No such factual determination was made, and given these parties'
positions, is one which will clearly be in dispute.
c.
Contrary to Orvis' false assertion, Johnson's public policy and
partnership accounting argument that judicial estoppel may not be used to preclude
discovery of the truth were squarely raised in the Court of Appeals,
The claim that Johnson never asserted that judicial estoppel may not be used to
preclude discovery of the truth again ignores every pleading he filed in the Court of Appeals.
His initial Appellant's Brief contained an Argument VI entitled "ORVIS-JOHNSON
PARTNERSHIP. A. The Orvis-Johnson partnership is clear and well documented and the
district court should be required to require an accounting of the partnership immediately."
Johnson's Appellant's Reply Brief contained an Argument II.E. entitled "Orvis is Barred
From Invoking the Doctrine to Block the Truth Herein." Orvis' deceit and embezzlement was
raised before the trial court in part as to why judicial estoppel should not apply, R. 2708, Tr.
p. 20,1.1-6. It was argued in Johnson's Affidavit and Memorandum, see e.g. R. 2243,2262.
Orvis' contrary claim like most of his other arguments are simply refuted if the true
pleadings and record are examined and not what Orvis mischaracterizes them as being. It is
simply not credible to assert that Johnson's position that judicial estoppel cannot be used to
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block discovery of the truth must be overlooked in this Court or to conceal the
embezzlement, fraud and misappropriation of partnership funds by Orvis.
CONCLUSION
Orvis has failed to properly support a motion for summary judgement with all
elements required to invoke the doctrine of judicial estoppel. His opening Brief mis-states
the record and provides mere argument about what the law should be rather than what the
law was at the time Judge Hanson rendered his improper Order. Based upon the foregoing,
this Court is respectfully urged to reverse the Court of Appeals and District Court and to
remand this to District Court for a trial on the merit.
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